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D. Paul Dalton * *
Mark T Josephs * * *
Je'frey E. Oleynik****
ONFLICT of laws involves primarily the areas of choice of law,
judgments, and judicial jurisdiction. During this survey period
Texas case law reflects a major but expected choice of law develop-
ment, some activity with little substantive change concerning treatment of
foreign judgments, and a continuing state of flux as to judicial jurisdiction.
I. CHOICE OF LAW
Undoubtedly the most significant case decided during the survey period
in Texas dealing with choice of law principles was Duncan v. Cessna Air-
craft Co. I In Duncan the Texas Supreme Court extended the use of the
most significant relationship test proposed by the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws,2 holding that the Restatement (Second) interest analysis
* This Article is dedicated to the memory of A.J. Thomas, late Dean Ad Interim and
William Hawley Atwell Professor of Constitutional Law at Southern Methodist University
School of Law. Dean Thomas authored several of the prior survey articles on Conflict of
Laws.
** B.S., University of Houston College of Pharmacy; J.D., Southern Methodist Univer-
sity. Attorney at Law, Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
*** B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law,
Jackson, Walker, Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
**** B.A., College of William & Mary; J.D., University of Virginia. Attorney at Law,
Jackson, Walker Winstead, Cantwell & Miller, Dallas, Texas.
1.' 27 Tex. Aup. Ct. J. 213 (Feb. 15, 1984). This opinion replaces the court's prior opin-
ion in this case, which appeared at 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 507 (July 13, 1983). The new opinion
makes no change in the court's decision concerning conflict of laws, the court having granted
a motion for rehearing on an entirely separate issue.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 6, 145 (1971). Section 6 sets
forth the Restatement (Second) choice of law principles, and provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory di-
rective of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the
applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international system,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c). the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative inter-
ests bof those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
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will apply to nearly every future choice of law question in Texas.3 In so
doing, the court took the next logical step after Gutierrez v. Collins4 and
Robertson v. Estate of McKnight,5 cases in which the court had first ap-
plied the most significant relationship test to tort choice of law issues.
The Duncan case involved choice of law as applied to a contractual re-
lease agreement. Carolyn Parker Duncan, the plaintiff, brought suit for
damages occasioned by the death of her husband in a 1976 crash of a
Cessna aircraft in New Mexico. The crash also killed Benjamin Smithson,
the instructor pilot who was giving Parker flying lessons at the time of the
crash. Smithson was employed by Air Plains West, Inc., the aircraft's
owner. Mrs. Duncan originally sued Air Plains West and Smithson's es-
tate, complaining of their alleged negligence, but that suit was terminated
when she settled with Air Plains West for $90,000 and executed a release.6
Mrs. Duncan and Smithson's widow subsequently instituted wrongful
death actions against Cessna, alleging the existence of design and manu-
facturing defects in the aircraft.7
The choice of law question became crucial to Mrs. Duncan's action
against Cessna. If construed under Texas law, the release previously
signed by Mrs. Duncan, which had terminated her suit against Air Plains
West and Smithson's estate, would not have barred her subsequent action
against Cessng.8 Under New Mexico law, however, the release would
have discharged any named tortfeasor or any tortfeasor who came within a
named general class.9 Therefore, if construed under New Mexico law, the
Id. § 6. Section 145 establishes the general principles with regard to interest analysis. Sub-
section 2 of § 145 states:
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to
determine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is
centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue.
Id § 145(2).
3. The court specifically excepted from application of the most significant relationship
test those situations in which the parties' contract contains a valid forum selection clause. 27
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 216. For an example during the survey period of a court's giving effect to
a forum selection clause, see City of Austin v. Decker Coal Co., 701 F.2d 420 (5th Cir. 1983).
4. 583 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1979).
5. 609 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. 1980). For a discussion of Gutierrez and Robertson, see
Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 35 Sw. L.J. 333, 349-51 (1981).
6. The release did not specifically mention Cessna but released generally "any other
corporations or persons whomsoever responsible therefor, whether named herein or not .... "
27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 213 (emphasis in original).
7. While Mrs. Duncan's action against Smithson's estate and Air Plains West, Inc. had
complained of the crash itself, the suit against Cessna alleged that design and manufacturing
defects in the legs of the aircraft's cockpit seats caused the legs to break during the crash,
resulting in the deaths of Parker and Smithson. Id.




release would have barred Mrs. Duncan's claims against Cessna.10
The Supreme Court of Texas used the Duncan case as its vehicle for
completely abandoning lex loci choice of law principles in other than ex-
tremely limited situations. As had been anticipated,"I in place of lex loci
the court substituted the Restatement (Second) analysis it had previously
adopted in Gutierrez for tort cases in Texas. Under the most significant
relationship test, the court in Duncan determined that Texas law should
apply to the construction of the release, noting that the interests of New
Mexico defendants were not at stake.' 2 The court concluded that Texas
interests outweighed any possible contacts the parties may have had with
New Mexico.' 3 Thus, Mrs. Duncan's claims against Cessna were not
barred by the previously executed release.
Under the principles of law in effect prior to the Duncan decision, con-
tract cases had remained subject to lex loci choice of law principles. 14 In
fact, Texas courts had taken the better part of two decades since interest
analysis was first applied' 5 to apply the test in Texas. The Duncan case
completed the evolution of the judicial adoption of interest analysis in
Texas, leaving only minor exceptions to the application of the Restatement
(Second) method of determining which state's law should apply.' 6 As a
result, "in all choice of law cases [in Texas], . . . the law of the state with
the most significant relationship to the particular substantive issue will be
applied to resolve that issue."' 7
Although Duncan clearly makes choice of law questions easier by elimi-
10. Id. (citing Johnson v. City of Las Cruces, 86 N.M. 196, 521 P.2d 1037 (Ct. App.
1974 ).
11. Obviously, abandonment of lex loci for contract actions in Texas seemed certain to
occur. Courts and commentators alike predicted completion of the demise of lex loci after
the Gutierrez case. See, e.g., Whitley v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 532 F. Supp. 190
(N.D. Tex. 1981), aff'dper curiam, 670 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1982); Comment, Abandonment of
Lex Loci Delicti in Texas: The Adoption of the Most Significant Relationship Test, 33 Sw. L.J.
1221 (1980). In discussing Gutierrez, the Whitley court stated: "Although the court's deci-
sion [in Gutierrez] was limited to tort actions, there is some opinion that the decision could
also portend the demise of the mechanical choice of law rule governing contract actions in
Texas and the incorporation of the 'most significant relationship' test." 532 F. Supp. at 194.
12. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 216.
13. Id. The only New Mexico contacts were the following: the decedent James Parker
worked in New Mexico; the decedent Benjamin Smithson lived and worked in New Mexico;
and Air Plains West was a New Mexico corporation. Id.
14. The fact that interest analysis, as first adopted in Gutierrez, had not been extended
to contract cases in Texas was not lost upon the court of appeals. That court stated:
Neither Gutierrez nor Robertson hold that contractual releases of tort liability
are governed by the "most significant relationship" test of § 145 of the Re-
statement, and we find . . . no Texas case which holds that such contractual
releases from tort liability are governed by the test. Until the Supreme Court
expressly decides that conflicts cases involving tort releases are to be governed
by the § 145 test, this Court will continue to apply the lex loci contractus rule
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 632 S.W.2d 375, 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1982) (foot-
note omitted), rev'd, 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 213 (Feb. 15, 1984).
15. The most significant relationship test was first used by a court in the United States
in 1963. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
16. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
17. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 216.
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nating the need to characterize the case as being based upon tort or upon
contract,' 8 interest analysis under the Restatement (Second) principles
complicates choice of law questions in other ways. 19 The relative advan-
tages and disadvantages of interest analysis and lex loci principles were
demonstrated by several cases decided during the survey period, including
Guilory v. United States,20 New York Life Insurance Co. v. Baum,21 and
Houston North Hospital Properties v. Telco Leasing, Inc. 22
In Guillory v. United States23 the Fifth Circuit, using Texas choice of law
rules,24 applied the most significant relationship test of the Restatement
(Second) .25 Noting that the district court's decision on the choice of law
issue would not be disturbed unless" 'against the more cogent reasoning of
the best and most widespread authority,'"26 the court reversed the lower
court's determination that Texas law should apply to the case. The Guil-
lory case arose as a result of the death of David Guillory, who had been
treated at a Veterans Administration hospital in Houston, Texas. Guillory
subsequently died in Lake Charles, Louisiana, but his death was traced to
his earlier treatment at the Texas hospital. Guillory's survivors brought
suit in a Louisiana federal district court and argued for application of Lou-
isiana substantive law, which would have permitted a recovery for loss of
love and affection, damages not compensable under Texas law. 27 The trial
court ruled that Texas law would apply.
28
The Fifth Circuit conceded that both Louisiana and Texas had "legiti-
mate policy interests in applying their respective substantive law."'29 The
court further opined that Texas had a real interest in forcing doctors
within its boundaries to comply with the state's relevant standard of care. 30
18. See infra notes 19, 42-44, and accompanying text.
19. For discussion of some of the difficulties encountered in applying the most signifi-
cant relationship tests, see Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of
Laws. A Response to the "New Critics", 34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983), and Seidelson,
Interest Analysis- The Quest/or Perfection and the Frailties of Man, 19 DUQ. L. REV. 207
(1981).
20. 699 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1983).
21. 700 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1983) (originally published at 697 F.2d 1245, and subse-
quently withdrawn from publication).
22. 688 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1982).
23. 699 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1983).
24. Texas choice of law principles applied in Guillory because the suit was under the
federal tort claims act. Under that statute, the place where the acts or omissions occurred
determines which state's choice of law rules apply. Id. at 784 (citing Richards v. United
States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962)). The other federal cases discussed herein involving choice of law
apply Texas choice of law principles because Texas was the forum in which the court was
sitting. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec.
Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
25. For the factors to consider in the Restatement (Second) interest analysis, see supra
note 2 and accompanying text.
26. 699 F.2d at 784 (quoting Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co., 663 F.2d 598, 601 (5th Cir.
1981)). This statement does not appear to provide a particularly clear standard for review of
lower court rulings.
27. 699 F.2d at 784.
28. Id.




Nevertheless, the court reversed in favor of applying Louisiana law, con-
cluding that "Louisiana unarguably has a legitimate interest in assuring
that its citizens are adequately compensated for injuries caused by doctors'
substandard conduct."'31 The court deemed Texas's interest in policing the
conduct of its physicians "of diminished consequence, ' 32 because Louisi-
ana also requires a relatively stringent standard of care for its physicians.
33
Guillory seems to underscore the difficulty that the Restatement (Second)
analysis creates in cases involving close choice of law questions. Ulti-
mately, the determination of which state's law should apply in such cases
becomes a nearly immeasurable quantitative and qualitative positioning of
the Restatement (Second) factors. Thus, a more clearly defined standard of
appellate review seems appropriate. 34 Nevertheless, interest analysis pro-
vides the courts with a "'rational yet flexible approach to conflicts
problems, . . .' -35 an approach arguably more in tune with "the demands
of our highly mobile modern society."
36
In New York Life Insurance Co. v. Baum ,37 decided prior to Duncan, the
court grappled with the now-outdated lex loci contractus approach to
choice of law. The Baum case involved interpretation of an insurance con-
tract that was, in the district court's opinion, to be performed in several
states. The contract insured the life of an individual who was killed in
Texas. Both a Louisiana resident, Baum, and a Texas corporation sought
payment of the proceeds under the insurance policy. Thus, according to
the district court, performance of the contract was contemplated in more
than one jurisdiction. The lower court also concluded that Louisiana law
applied to the construction of the contract, reasoning that because " 'Loui-
siana is the place where the contract was made, Texas law presumes that
the parties to the contract intended for Louisiana law to govern .... "-38
The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that New York law should apply to
the interpretation of the contract. The court disagreed with the district
court's analysis concerning performance in more than one jurisdiction,
noting "that incidental performance in one state would not preclude the
application of the law of the state where the bulk of performance occurred,
and in which the contract itself was made."' 39 The court further deter-
mined that the contract had in fact been made in New York, relying upon
the fine distinctions governing the place of making of an insurance con-
31. Id.
32. Id. at 786.
33. Id.
34. Specifically, the question arises whether a federal trial court's decision, weighing the
appropriate factors and applying a particular state's law, should be subject to review under
standards applicable to conclusions of law, or standards for findings of fact.
35. Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 213, 215 (Feb. 15, 1984) (quoting
Guitierrez v. Collins, 583 S.W.2d 312, 318 (Tex. 1979)).
36. 27 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 215.
37. 700 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1983) (originally published at 697 F.2d 1245, and subse-
quently withdrawn from publication).
38. Id. at 930 (quoting New York Life Ins. Co. v. Baum, 617 F.2d 1201, 1201-03 (5th
Cir. 1980)).
39. 700 F.2d at 931.
1984]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
tract that had become critical to the lex loci contractus analysis. 40 Baum
illustrates, therefore, the fortuitous nature of certain actions that can give
effect to, and determine the interpretation of, contractual agreements
under the lex loci analysis.
4
'
In Houston North Hospital Properties v. Telco Leasing, Inc. ,42 also de-
cided before Duncan, the Fifth Circuit applied the most significant rela-
tionship test to a case arising out of a dispute over a contract. 43 In the
opinion on rehearing, the court apparently held that the plaintiffs eco-
nomic duress claim arising out of the contract's negotiation was based
upon tort. The court held that the most significant relationship test of Gu-
tierrez therefore should apply.44
Each of the cases discussed points to the respective shortcomings of the
Restatement (Second) and lex loci analyses. In Guillory45 the possibility of
subjective or unpredictable results in close choice of law questions decided
under the Restatement (Second) test was apparent. Baum 46 illustrated the
difficulty of determining place of making and the fortuitous nature of cer-
tain aspects of contract formation, with each aspect of the case becoming a
relevant factor in the court's lex loci analysis. Telco Leasing47 presented
the potential problem of characterizing the action as being based upon tort
or contract principles during the pre-Duncan, post-Gutierrez era. Obvi-
ously, the Duncan case resolves the last two of the three problem areas.
The survey period produced only two other cases that considered choice
of law principles. In Meyers v. Moody48 the court discussed the inter-rela-
tionship of the Texas Business Corporation Act 49 and the Insurance
Code50 in the context of choice of law. Article 9.14 of the Business Corpo-
40. The court noted a distinction, for the purposes of the place of making the contract,
between conditional and unconditional delivery of insurance contracts. It stated:
Thus, it is clear that, under Texas law, where an agent must verify to his satis-
faction a certain condition of the insured prior to delivering the insurance
contract, the final act of the making of the contract occurs at the place where
the insured resides. However, where delivery of the policy is unconditional,
the contract is deemed to have been made at the domicile of the insurance
company.
Id. at 932.
41. See also Kuzel v. Aetna Ins. Co., 650 S.W.2d 193 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1983,
writ refd n.r.e.) (place of making insurance contract analyzed by court).
42. 688 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1982).
43. See Houston N. Hosp. Properties v. Telco Leasing, 680 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1982)
(initial opinion on debtor-creditor action).
44. 688 F.2d at 409.
45. Guillory v. United States, 699 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1983).
46. New York Life Insurance Co. v. Baum, 700 F.2d 928 (5th Cir. 1983) (originally
published at 697 F.2d 1245, and subsequently withdrawn from publication).
47. Houston N. Hosp. Properties v. Telco Leasing, Inc., 688 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1982).
48. 693 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1982).
49. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.14 (Vernon 1980).
50. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. arts. 3.57, 21.43 (Vernon 1981). Article 3.57 provides:
No foreign or domestic insurance company shall transact any insurance busi-
ness in this State, other than the lending of money, unless it shall first procure
from the Board of Insurance Commissioners a certificate of authority, stating
that the laws of this State have been fully complied with by it, and authorizing
it to do business in this State. Such certificate of authority shall expire on the
[Vol. 38
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ration Act provides that the provisions of the Act do not apply "to any
foreign corporations which are granted authority to transact business
within this State under any special statutes .... ,,51 The Meyers court
noted that insurance companies are among those foreign corporations au-
thorized to transact business in Texas under a special statute, but observed
that the Insurance Code does not specify the duties or liabilities of the
officers or directors of insurance companies. 52 The court found, however,
that the officers and directors of a foreign corporation doing business in
Texas are subject to the same duties and liabilities that are imposed upon
officers and directors of domestic corporations under the Business Corpo-
ration Act. 53 Finding nothing inconsistent with that provision in the In-
surance Code, the court held that the defendant was subject to the same
duties and liabilities that Texas law imposes upon officers and directors of
Texas corporations.54
In Hines v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc. 55 the court held that, although
North Carolina substantive law would apply to the plaintiffs claims,
Texas's limitations statutes applied to the plaintiffs cause of action. 56 Not-
ing that statutes of limitations are procedural, the court concluded that
Texas courts, like courts in most jurisdictions, prefer to apply their state's
procedural law to the cases before them. 57 Thus, even though the question
of which state's statute of limitations should apply can have a significant
substantive effect on the outcome of a case, interest analysis does not affect
application of the statute of limitations, because limitations questions are
procedural in nature.
day fixed by the Board under Articles 3.06 and 3.08 of this code and shall be
renewed annually so long as the company shall continue to comply with the
laws of the State, such renewals to be granted upon the same terms and con-
siderations as the original certificate.
Id. art. 3.57. Article 21.43 sets forth the conditions upon which foreign insurance corpora-
tions are permitted to do business in Texas and provides in part:
(c) No foreign or alien insurance corporation shall be denied permission
to do business within this state for the reason that all of its authorized capital
stock has not been fully subscribed and paid for; provided
(1) That at least the minimum dollar amount of capital stock of such cor-
poration required by the laws of this state (which may be less than all of its
authorized capital stock) has been subscribed and paid for; and
(2) That it has at least the minimum dollar amount of surplus required by
the laws of this state for the kinds of business such corporations seek to write;
and
(3) That such corporation has fully complied with all laws of its domicili-
ary state relating to authorization and issuance of capital stock.
Id art. 21.43.
51. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 9.14 (Vernon 1980).
52. 693 F.2d at 1209.
53. Id
54. Id
55. 546 F. Supp. 1229 (S.D. Tex. 1982).
56. Id. at 1232.
57. Id. at 1233.
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II. JUDGMENTS-FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
The United States Constitution provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall
be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceed-
ings of every other State."'58 Although no remarkably new Texas law was
made concerning foreign judgments during the survey period, several cases
discussed the validity, enforcement, or effect of foreign judgments under
Texas law. Additionally, the legislature enacted a minor amendment to
the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act 59 during the survey
period.
A. Default Judgments-Challenges to Jurisdiction
In recent years, cases involving foreign default judgments presented for
enforcement in Texas courts have provided several opportunities for com-
mentators to address the significance of, and the requirements for, chal-
lenging the jurisdiction of the court that entered the default judgment.60
During the survey period, the Corpus Christi court of appeals in Fuhrer v.
Rinyu61 attempted to distill and clarify the analysis elements for these
cases. After initially concluding that the law concerning jurisdictional
challenges to default judgments had become confused, the Fuhrer court
endeavored to present and describe the rules applicable to direct and col-
lateral attacks on default judgments.62 As it turns out, however, this at-
tempt at clarification may itself have created a new wrinkle of confusion.
The Fuhrer case arose out of a default judgment obtained in Michigan
by Fuhrer against Rinyu and Altype Mortgage Service, Inc. Fuhrer
brought suit against both defendants in Texas to enforce the judgment.
His entire case consisted only of an authenticated copy of the judgment
and an order from the Michigan court authorizing service upon the de-
fendants by regular first class mail.63 The sole defense offered was a claim
that the Michigan court had no personal jurisdiction over either defendant
because of improper service of process. 64
In rejecting the defendants' claim and ordering enforcement of the
Michigan judgment, the Corpus Christi court stated:
[The Michigan] judgment is entitled to the same presumption jf regu-
larity in jurisdiction as a domestic judgment and such presumption
can be overthrown only by clear and convincing evidence of want of
jurisdiction. The burden of proof with respect to the jurisdiction of
the court of a sister state to render judgment is ordinarily on the party
58. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
59. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
60. See, e.g., Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw. L.J. 385,
389-95 (1980); Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 33 Sw. L.J. 425, 434-
42 (1979); Thomas, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 32 Sw. L.J. 387, 399
(1978).
61. 647 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
62. Id at 317.




claiming want of jurisdiction.65
The court further observed that the defendants failed to offer any evidence
to show that they were not actually served in the manner provided by the
Michigan court's order, that the order regarding service of process was in-
valid, or that the recitals in the judgment were invalid.66 The court there-
fore held that the Michigan judgment was entitled to full faith and credit
and would be enforced. 67
Predictably, Rinyu filed a motion for rehearing.68 This motion chal-
lenged the court's holding that a foreign default judgment is entitled to a
presumption of validity and regularity. In support of that position, Rinyu
cited four Texas court of appeals opinions.69 While the Fuhrer court ad-
mitted that those cases "seem to adopt the view that there are no presump-
tions in favor of a foreign default judgment, ' 70 it disagreed that such
position was actually the law in Texas.7'
The earliest case relied upon by Rinyu, Country Clubs, Inc. v. Ward,
72
involved a Kentucky judgment presented for enforcement in Texas. In
that opinion, the Dallas court of civil appeals actually stated that "the or-
dinary presumptions in support of the judgment. . . are not available in
attacks against default judgments. '73 The court cited the Texas Supreme
Court's opinion in McKanna v. Edgar74 as support for that proposition.
75
In McKanna, however, the supreme court reviewed a direct attack on a
Texas judgment,76 and the court's specific holding was that "[w]hile ordi-
narily presumptions are made in support of a judgment . . . .no such
presumptions are made in a direct attack upon a default judgment. '77 By
contrast, the proceeding reviewed in Country Club unquestionably was a
collateral, rather than a direct, attack on the foreign default judgment.78
65. Id. at 317.
66. Id.
67. Id
68. Id. It is apparent from a review of the court's opinion that Altype Mortgage Service
Company, Inc. did not join in the motion for rehearing. Id at 317-19.
69. Rinyu cited Bayne v. Heid, 638 S.W.2d 40 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no
writ); Mathis v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 583 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist
Dist.] 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Jackson v. Randall, 544 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texar-
kana 1976, no writ); Country Clubs, Inc. v. Ward, 461 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1970, writ refd n.r.e.). Fuhrer, 647 S.W.2d at 317.
70. 647 S.W.2d at 317.
71. Id
72. 461 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ refd n.r.e.).
73. Id at 655. A later opinion of the Dallas court repudiated the correctness of this
position. See A & S Distrib. Co. v. Providence Pile Fabric Corp., 563 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.).
74. 388 S.W.2d 927 (Tex. 1965).
75. 461 S.W.2d at 655.
76. 388 S.W.2d at 928.
77. Id at 929 (emphasis added).
78. Cf. Reeves v. Fuqua, 277 S.W. 418, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1925, writ
dism'd) (collateral attack is any proceeding in which integrity of judgment is challenged,
other than action where judgment rendered). Id. For a thorough explanation of what con-
stitutes a collateral attack, including descriptions of exceptions to the above definition, see
generally Hodges, Collateral Attacks on Judgments, 41 TEx. L. REV. 163, 170-73 (1962-63)
(listing examples of collateral attacks).
19841
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JO URNAL
Although the supreme court refused to grant a writ of error in Country
Club, it is possible that the court's conclusion that no reversible error had
occurred resulted because the facts set forth by the Dallas court in the
Country Club opinion sufficiently demonstrated that any such presumption
in favor of the regularity of the judgment would nonetheless have been
rebutted. Consequently, the granting of a writ addressing the points would
probably have led to the same result.79
Each of the other three cases cited Country Club, McKanna, or both for
the proposition that no presumptions are indulged in favor of a default
judgment. These cases, like Country Club, made no distinction between
direct and collateral attacks. Of the three, only Mathis v. Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. 80 resulted in the filing of an application for writ of error. Again,
the supreme court refused to grant the writ. An examination of the facts
stated by the Houston court in its Mathis opinion reveals that, as in Coun-
try Club, any presumption of regularity that might have been imposed
would probably have been met and overcome.
While each of the other two cited opinions contains language to support
the Fuhrer court's conclusion that those cases stand for the proposition that
no presumptions are to be indulged in favor of foreign default judgments,
the analysis in each of those opinions actually assumes the existence of
such a presumption and discusses how the presumption is rebutted by the
evidence presented. 81 In any event, those four cases probably did "confuse
the various rules which apply to direct and collateral attacks on default
judgments. '8 2
The Fuhrer court attempted to clear up the confusion caused by the ap-
parent misstatements of law by stating the following rules: (1) For direct
attacks on Texas default judgments,83 "no presumptions will be indulged
in support of the judgment's validity;"' 84 (2) for collateral attacks on Texas
default judgments, "a clear and definite recital in the judgment on jurisdic-
tional matters is conclusive of the issues of jurisdiction"85 and confers ab-
solute verity upon such recitals such that no evidence in contradiction
79. Cf A & S Distrib. Co. v. Providence Pile Fabric Corp., 563 S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (subsequent opinion reaching same general conclu-
sion as in text about Country Club).
80. 583 S.W.2d 800 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
81. See Bayne v. Heid, 638 S.W.2d 40, 41 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1982, no
writ); Jackson v. Randall, 544 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
The Bayne court stated: "[T]he evidence presented by the appellant in his affidavit is suffi-
cient to overcome the presumption of regularity of service contained in the foreign [default]judgment." 638 S.W.2d at 41. The Jackson court stated: "The burden of going forward
with the evidence then shifted to the appellants. . . to rebut the presumption of the validity
of the New York judgment. In meeting this burden, the appellants have refuted by affidavit
the applicability of each element of the New York long arm statute .... 544 S.W.2d at
441.
82. Fuhrer, 647 S.W.2d at 317.
83. By definition, there could not be a direct attack in a Texas court on a foreign defaultjudgment. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.




thereof will be heard, even if irrefutable;86 (3) for attacks on foreign de-
fault judgments, 87 jurisdictional recitals in the default judgment are pre-
sumed to be valid, such that the person attacking the validity of the
judgment has the burden of proving that the issuing court had no
jurisdiction.88
The first rule stated is an accurate summary of the supreme court's hold-
ing in McKanna.89 Application of this rule is, however, clearly restricted
to direct attacks on default judgments. Since any attack in a Texas court
on a default judgment rendered by a sister state must, by definition, consti-
tute a collateral attack,90 the limitation in the McKanna opinion, if not
precluding, does not not support any application of this rule to attacks on
foreign default judgments.
The second rule presented by the Fuhrer court broadly states the general
principle of Texas law applicable to collateral attacks on Texas default
judgments. 9' The troublesome effect of the breadth of this statement while
not clear on the basis of its language, is addressed later in this discussion.
The third rule is also a generally correct statement of the law and repre-
sents a permissible inquiry.92 An initial examination reveals, however, that
the different standard set forth in the third Fuhrer rule for review of for-
eign default judgments is much weaker, being subject to rebuttal, than the
standard identified in the second rule for Texas default judgments. Al-
though this distinction may appear to offend principles of full faith and
credit, it actually does not do so.
Under the rule set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Pennoyer
v. Neff, 93 Texas courts unquestionably possess exclusive jurisdiction over
86. Id. at 317-18.
87. Attacks on foreign default judgments by their very nature can only be collateral
attacks. Id at 318.
88. Id. Although the Fuhrer court did not limit its description of this rule to only juris-
dictional recitals, these authors submit that such a limitation is actually a clearer description
of the true scope of the rule. Principles of full faith and credit require that the substantive
provisions of a final foreign judgment, whether default or otherwise, receive the same res
judicata treatment as would a domestic judgment, excluding only inquiries into the foreign
court's jurisdiction and fraudulent procurement. See, e.g., Bondeson v. Pepsico, Inc., 573
S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1978, no writ) (defense of fraudulent
procurement of judgment available); A & S Distrib. Co. v. Providence Pile Fabric Corp., 563
S.W.2d 281, 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (general civil jurisdiction of
foreign state noted). If, therefore, the foreign court had jurisdiction to issue the judgment,
and there is no showing of fraud, that judgment is conclusive of the matters it encompasses
and the doctrine of res judicata precludes another opportunity to relitigate the merits. See
Williamson v. Rodgers, 489 S.W.2d 558, 560 (Tex. 1973). Such conclusive treatment must
also be applied to a jurisdictional challenge where the defendant actually appeared in the
foreign proceeding. See Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 348 (1948). Abramowitz v. Miller,
649 S.W.2d 339, 342 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1983, no writ).
89. 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965).
90. See 647 S.W.2d at 318; A & S Distrib. Co. v. Providence Pile Fabric Corp., 563
S.W.2d 281, 286 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.); see also supra note 78.
91. See Imatani v. Marmolego, 606 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. Civ. App-Corpus Christi
1980, no writ), and cases cited therein.
92. See Mitchim v. Mitchim, 518 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Tex. 1975); Colson v. Thunderbird
Bldg. Materials, 589 S.W.2d 836, 839-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1979, writ ref d n.r.e.).
93. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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persons within the state's boundaries.94 Texas, therefore, has legitimate
and justifiable policy reasons for insuring the sanctity and finality of judg-
ments rendered in Texas against Texas residents. 95 The converse of the
Pennoyer rule is that a state does not have jurisdiction over persons
outside its boundaries. 96 This rule is, of course, subject to long-arm juris-
diction exceptions. These exceptions necessarily involve the presentation
and examination of, as well as a ruling upon, facts relative to the propriety
of a state's exercise of its jurisdiction over a nonresident. 97
For these reasons, a state has an undeniable interest in ascertaining
whether any assertion of jurisdiction over its residents by a sister state is
proper. Of course, when the defendant actually appeared in the foreign
proceeding, that foreign forum unquestionably obtained personal jurisdic-
tion over him, and that issue may not be relitigated. 98 Consequently, it
seems that only in a case seeking enforcement of a foreign default judg-
ment would a state's interest in reviewing a sister state court's jurisdiction
arise. In order to permit assertion of that interest, therefore, the jurisdic-
tion of the foreign court may be only presumed, rather than held, to be
conclusive.99 While this discussion clears up one apparent problem with
the Fuhrer court's statement of applicable rules, yet another problem could
arise from application of the literal language the court used in expressing
these rules.
A literal application of the second and third Fuhrer court rules for col-
lateral attacks in Texas on default judgments could produce differing
rights to jurisdictional challenges based upon whether or not the defendant
is a Texas resident. Under the third rule, a Texas resident clearly would
have an opportunity to contest the assertion of jurisdiction over him by a
foreign court by offering evidence to overcome the presumption. On the
other hand, the second rule appears to prohibit a non-Texas resident from
offering any evidence to refute the jurisdiction of a Texas court that had
entered a default judgment against him. Consequently, use of the second
and third Fuhrer court rules as stated could create an anomalous situation
wherein Texas courts would seem to favor the validity of a Texas judg-
ment against a non-Texas resident over a foreign state's judgment ren-
dered against a Texas resident. Fortunately, this situation is not truly a
problem with existing law; rather, it results from an oversight by the Fuh-
rer court to incorporate into its statement of the applicable rules the prin-
ciple that a state may not apply the rule of absolute verity for jurisdictional
94. Id at 722.
95. For a description of these policies, see Hodges, supra note 78, at 528.
96. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722.
97. See infra notes 149-206 and accompanying text.
98. Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
99. See, e.g., McElreath v. McElreath, 345 S.W.2d 722, 744 (Tex. 1961) (Texas court
considers validity of Oklahoma divorce decree); Roath v. Uniroyal, Inc., 582 S.W.2d 185,
186 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979, no writ) (Texas court may examine foreign state's
assertion of jurisdiction); A & S Distrib. Co. v. Providence Pile Fabric Corp., 563 S.W.2d
281, 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref d n.r.e.) (authentication of foreign judgment
establishes presumption of jurisdiction).
[Vol. 38
CONFLICT OF LAWS
recitations in default judgments to nonresidents.' °° Incorporating this
principle into the statement of the rules would result in consistent treat-
ment of judgments, fully in accord with full faith and credit requirements.
In setting forth its three rules governing attacks on default judgments,
therefore, the Fuhrer court should probably have noted two qualifications:
that the second rule applies to collateral attacks on Texas default judg-
ments, but only as against Texas residents; and that the third rule applies
to attacks by nonresidents against Texas default judgments as well as to
attacks on foreign default judgments.
B. Finality, Limitations, and Res Judicata
An earlier survey article discussed the most recent Texas Supreme Court
opinion dealing with the issue of finality of a foreign default judgment
sought to be enforced in Texas.' 0 ' Recently, the first district court of ap-
peals in Houston, in Medical Administrators, Inc. v. Koger Properties,
Inc., 102 considered a contention that a Florida judgment was not final be-
cause the Florida court had reserved jurisdiction to consider additional
attorney's fees incurred in attempts to enforce the judgment. Citing the
supreme court's opinion in State of Washington v. Williams, 10 3 as well as
the opinions in Beavers v. Beavers, 1' 4 Hargrove v. Insurance Investment
Corp. ,105 and Moody v. State, 0 6 the Houston court held the Florida judg-
ment to be final and subject to enforcement in Texas, stating:
[A] judgment otherwise disposing of all issues between the parties is
not rendered interlocutory if further proceedings may be required to
carry the judgment into effect. . . . Thus, a judgment may be final
even though further proceedings incidental to its proper execution are
provided for on the face of the judgment. 10 7
The Houston court logically extended the supreme court's holding in State
of Washington, concluding that enforcement of a foreign judgment cannot
be avoided by a claim of no finality merely because the judgment permits
assessment of additional attorney's fees incurred in enforcement of, or col-
lection upon, that judgment. 0 8
Ringer v. TransAmerica Insurance Co. 09 offered an opportunity for dis-
cussion of the application of limitations statutes to foreign judgments
presented for enforcement in Texas. In Ringer Clinical Development Cor-
poration brought an action in Oklahoma against its employees, B.R. and
100. See O'Boyle v. Bevil, 259 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 913 (1959);
Hicks v. Sias, 102 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1937, writ ref'd).
101. See Newton, supra note 60, at 408-09.
102. No. 01-83-0111 -CV (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.], Sept. 1, 1983, no writ) (avail-
able Jan. 15, 1984, on LEXIS, States library, Tex. file).
103. 584 S.W.2d 260 (Tex. 1979).
104. 651 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, no writ).
105. 142 Tex. 111, 176 S.W.2d 744 (1944).
106. 520 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
107. No. 01-83-011I-CV.
108. Id.
109. 650 S.W.2d 520 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
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Mary Ringer, and against its insurer, TransAmerica. The action was
based upon alleged fraud by the employees and a claim of policy coverage
for losses resulting from such fraud. TransAmerica cross-claimed for in-
demnity against the Ringers. The Oklahoma court entered judgment
against the Ringers and TransAmerica for $73,659 on July 14, 1969.' °
Upon TransAmerica's appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment on August 3, 1971."'1 The Ringers did not appeal and moved to
Texas in 1970. On April 14, 1976, TransAmerica, having satisfied the en-
tire judgment to the original Oklahoma plaintiff, sued in Texas to enforce
its judgment for indemnity against Mr. Ringer." 12 Ringer defended the
action on the basis that, at the time the Texas suit was commenced, the
judgment was not enforceable because it was dormant under the
Oklahome five-year dormancy statute.'1 3 Ringer alternatively contended
that the Oklahoma one year limitations statute for foreign judgments had
expired well before the Texas action was filed.
The Ringer court first noted the general principle in Texas that a suit on
a foreign judgment is barred "if it would have been barred in the foreign
jurisdiction under its laws."' '4 The Oklahoma dormancy statute was un-
questionably five years.'1 5 Ringer contended, however, that because he
had not appealed the Oklahoma judgment against him, it was final as to
him on September 30, 1969, the date his motion for new trial in the
Oklahoma proceeding had been overruled. Thus, according to Ringer, the
Texas action had been brought more than five years following rendition of
the judgment against him. In short, Ringer wanted the court to find that
two separate judgments emanated from that lawsuit, one as to the Ringers
and a subsequent one as to TransAmerica.116
The court rejected this contention, holding that there can be "only one
judgment per cause" '" 7 and that, since "[a] judgment for indemnity neces-
sarily requires a prior determination of liability . . . , [Ringer's] liability
to [TransAmerica] did not accrue until [TransAmerica's] liability to
Clinical had been finally determined by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court."' 18 As Ringer's liability accrued less than five years prior to the
filing of the Texas suit, enforcement of the Oklahoma judgment was not
barred by the five-year Oklahoma dormancy statute.' 19
The court also summarily rejected Ringer's suggestion that the Texas
action was barred under the Oklahoma one-year limitations statute for
suits on foreign judgments, because the judgment being sued upon was not
110. Id. at 521.
I11. Id.
112. Id. Mary Ringer apparently was not a party to the action to enforce the judgment.
113. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 735 (West 1960).
114. 650 S.W.2d at 522 (citing TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5530 (Vernon 1958)).







foreign to Oklahoma.120 Finally, the court addressed the question of post-
judgment interest on foreign judgments. Observing that the laws of
Oklahoma on post-judgment interest had not been proven, the court pre-
sumed such laws to be identical to those of Texas.121 Thus, the court held
that the six percent post-judgment interest provided for by Texas's article
5069-1.05 was applicable and remanded for calculation of that
interest. 122
An interesting discussion of res judicata principles appeared during the
survey period in Goodier v. Duncan.123 Goodier and Duncan had submit-
ted their controversy to arbitration in California, which resulted in an
award for Goodier. Goodier subsequently brought an action seeking to
have a Texas court give full faith and credit to, and enforce, the arbitration
award. That action was eventually nonsuited with prejudice. Meanwhile,
Goodier obtained a California judgment nunc pro tunc confirming the
original arbitration award. Goodier thereafter filed a second lawsuit in the
same Texas court seeking enforcement of the California judgment.
Duncan claimed that the nonsuit with prejudice of the first Texas lawsuit
barred the second lawsuit under principles of res judicata.
Recognizing that the California judgment was simply a judicial confir-
mation of the same arbitration award that Mr. Goodier had sued upon in
the first Texas action, the Goodier court nevertheless held that the second
lawsuit was not barred because the court found "no identity of cause of
action in the two lawsuits."' 124 In support of that conclusion the Dallas
court expressly held "that the cause of action upon the judgment stands
separate and apart with an identity all its own from the cause of action out
of which it arose."' 125 The court's analysis included a lengthy quote from
the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Milwaukee County v. ME.
White Co. 126 In Milwaukee County the Court specifically held that a cause
of action on a judgment differs from the cause of action upon which the
judgment was entered. 27 The Goodier court concluded that the trial court
erroneously treated the order of dismissal in the first action as barring the
second action under the doctrine of res judicata. 128 The court thus ordered
that the California judgment be enforced. 29
One other case during the survey period discussed the interrelationship
of principles of res judicata and conflict of laws. In Hornsby Oil Co. v.
Champion Spark Plug Co. 130 a prior Texas state court action between the
120. Id
121. Id. at 523.
122. Id. (citing TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN art. 5069-1.05 (Vernon Pam. Supp. 1971-
83)).
123. 651 S.W.2d 25 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1983, writ ref d n.r.e.).
124. Id. at 27.
125. Id
126. 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
127. Id. at 275.
128. 651 S.W.2d at 27.
129. Id.
130. 714 F.2d 1384 (5th Cir. 1983).
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same parties involving some of the same claims asserted in the federal ac-
tion had been dismissed for want of prosecution. Hornsby contended that
assertion of those claims in a subsequent federal suit was barred by Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The rule specifies that a dismissal, un-
less otherwise specified therein, "operates as an adjudication upon the
merits." 131 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this contention
holding that a federal court is required to accord a state court dismissal the
same effect as would the state courts. The court observed that, as Texas
courts do not treat a dismissal for failure to prosecute as an adjudication
on the merits, no res judicata effect attached to the state court dismissal. 132
C. Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act
A thorough analysis of the provisions of the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act 133 (hereinafter the Judgments Act) as adopted in
Texas has been presented in a previous survey article. 134 The Texas legis-
lature, however, made a minor change to that statute during the survey
period.135 The Judgments Act, as originally adopted in Texas, required a
filing fee of ten dollars, but it contained no provision as to when that fee
had to be paid.' 36 The legislature amended the act to require that the fee
be "the amount as otherwise provided by law for filing suit in the courts of
this state."' 37 The amendment also made the fee due and payable at the
time of filing.' 3s These amendments should effect no significant change in
the manner in which foreign judgments are presented for enforcement.
Additionally, equating the amount of the fee with that for filing suit should
simplify bookkeeping procedures for both attorneys and court clerks, even
though it will undoubtedly result in an increase in the actual amount of the
fee paid.
Although the article referenced above detailed the provisions of the
Judgments Act, 139 it made no mention of the mechanics of using the stat-
ute. While the act states that "[a] copy of any foreign judgment authenti-
cated in accordance with an act of congress or statutes of this state may be
filed in the office of the clerk of any court of competent jurisdiction of this
state,"' 140 it does not identify the statutes of this state in accordance with
which authentication may be achieved.
MedicalAdministrators, Inc. v. Koger Properties, Inc. 141 described proce-
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).
132. 714 F.2d at 1397.
133. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
134. Newton, Conflict of Laws, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 36 Sw. L.J. 397, 433-34
(1982).
135. Act of May 26, 1983, ch. 731, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4504.
136. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
137. Act of May 26, 1983, ch. 731, § 5(a), 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 4504.
138. Id § 5(b).
139. Newton, supra note 134, at 433-34.
140. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-5, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
141. No. 01-83-011 1-CV (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] Sept. 1, 1984, no writ) (avail-
able Jan. 15, 1984, on LEXIS, States library, Tex. file).
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dures by which the Judgments Act may be effectuated. In MedicalAdmin-
istrators the plaintiff filed a summary final judgment attested by a Florida
court clerk and a certificate from a Florida judge that the attestation was in
proper form in accordance with article 3731a. 142 Finding that foreign
judgments are included within the scope of documents referenced in sec-
tion 2 of article 3731 a, the court held that authentication thereof in accord-
ance with the provisions of section 4 of article 3731a was completely
sufficient to constitute the authentication requirement of the Judgments
Act. 143 On September 1, 1983, however, the new Texas Rules of Evidence
became effective, thereby repealing article 3731 a. 144 Texas Rules of Evi-
dence 902(1) and 902(2) address authentication of domestic public docu-
ments under seal and not under seal. 145 Rule 902 provides, in general, that
a sister state's judgment is properly authenticated if presented with a certi-
fication under seal by a public officer or employee of the political subdivi-
sion or district issuing the judgment that the signature on the judgment is
genuine and the signer was vested with official capacity. 146 The same rule
may be used to certify a copy of that judgment. 147
Additionally, the Medical Administrators court identified a federal stat-
ute that also may be used to achieve authentication in compliance with the
Judgments Act."n8 The court did not, however, invoke that statute. A for-
eign judgment, therefore, can be properly authenticated for filing under
the Judgments Act in accordance with either the federal statute or Texas
Rule of Evidence 902.
III. JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction section of the last Conflict of Laws survey focused on
the reach of the Texas long-arm statute.149 Attention was particularly ad-
dressed to the scope of the Texas Supreme Court's first opinion in the case
of Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (Hall 1). 150 That Ar-
ticle concluded that Hall I left open the question of whether article
142. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 373 Ia (Vernon Supp. 1984). Section 2 of art. 373 1a
permitted admission into evidence:
Any written instrument which is permitted or required by law to be made,
filed, kept or recorded (including but not limited to certificate, written state-
ment, contract, deed, conveyance, lease, concession, covenant, grant, record,
return, report or recorded event) by an officer or clerk of. . . another state
• . . or by his deputy or employer ....
Id. § 2. Although that statute did not specifically mention judgments, the MedicalAdinis-
trators court found that such are encompassed within the foregoing provision. No. 01-83-
011 I-CV.
143. No. 01-83-0111-CV.
144. See TEX. R. EVID., Order of Adoption and Enumeration of Repealed Statutes.
145. Id 902(1), (2).
146. Id. 902(2).
147. Id. 1005.
148. No. 01-83-0111-CV. The statute identified by the court was 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1976).
149. See Newton, supra note 134, at 397-403.
150. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 190 (Feb. 24, 1982), discussed in Newton, supra note 134, at 399-
401.
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203 1b,15 the Texas long-arm statute, "extend[s] jurisdiction to the consti-
tutional limits in every case."' 52 Specifically, Ha//I left unclear whether
the determination of personal jurisdiction in Texas necessarily entails a
two-step evaluation. For any given case involving a personal jurisdiction
issue, the two-step process in question would ask, first, whether the re-
quirements of article 2031b had been met and, second, whether the exer-
cise of jurisdiction would be consistent with constitutional requirements of
due process. ' 5 3
During the survey period, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its origi-
nal opinion in Hall and substituted a new opinion (Hall I1), 54 once again
placing the reach of article 203 1 b in issue. One federal district court has
opined that Hall I "apparently negated the need for the first step in the
process and permitted courts to move directly to the question of due pro-
cess."' 55 The authors of this Article submit, however, that HallII has not
negated the first step of the process for all jurisdictional questions. Al-
though the federal district court in the referenced decision actually found
it unnecessary to determine Hall I's exact scope, 156 this review of survey
period decisions focuses on precisely such an analysis.
A. Historical Background
Determining the limits of long-arm jurisdiction in Texas involves inter-
preting the legislature's language limiting article 203 lb to "causes of action
arising out of such business done in this State" and "action[s], suit[s] or
proceedings arising out of such business done in this State."' 57 Efforts at
such interpretation have provided a continuing source of controversy since
the enactment of the statute.' 58 Prior to the Hall decisions, earlier opin-
151. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (Vernon 1964).
152. Newton, supra note 134, at 401.
153. See infra notes 199-203 and accompanying text.
154. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1982),
cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 1270, 75 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1983).
155. Bennett Indus., Inc. v. Laher, 557 F. Supp. 965, 966 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
156. Id
157. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b, § 3 (Vernon 1964) provides:
Any ...non-resident natural person that engages in business in this State,
irrespective of any Statute or law respecting designation or maintenance of
resident agents, and does not maintain a place of regular business in this State
or a designated agent upon whom service may be made upon causes of action
arising out of such business done in this State, the act or acts of engaging in
such business within this State shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment
by such ...non-resident natural person of the Secretary of State . .. as
agent upon whom service of process may be made in any action, suit or pro-
ceedings arising out ofsuch business done in this State, wherein such. . . non-
resident natural person is a party or is to be made a party.
Id. (emphasis added).
158. See Newton, supra note 134, at 397-403; Newton, supra note 60; Thomas, supra note
60; Comment, Article 2031b and Rule 108 after Hall v. Helicopteros." Another Proposal, 34
BAYLOR L. REV. 497 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Article 2031b]; Comment, Hall
v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.: Status of the Nexus Requirement in Texas
Long-Arm Jurisdiction Analysis, 24 S. TEX. L.J. 305 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Status of the Nexus Requirement]; Comment, The Texas Long-Arm Statute, Article 2031b." A
New Process is Due, 30 Sw. L. 747 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Texas Long-
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ions of the Texas Supreme Court only increased the confusion.' 59 The
prevailing view among lower courts in Texas, as well as in the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decisions,' 60 had been that the "arising out of' language of article
2031 b should be read and applied literally "to require a nexus between the
cause of action asserted and the defendant's contacts with Texas."' 61 The
basis for this position, in addition to the literal language of article 203 lb,
was the three-pronged test set forth by the Texas Supreme Court in
O'Brien v. Lanpar Co. 162 This test provided for jurisdiction over a nonres-
ident defendant only under the following circumstances:
".. . (1) [t]he nonresident defendant or foreign corporation must
purposefully do some act or consummate some transaction in the fo-
rum state; (2) the cause of action must arise from, or be connected
with, such act or transaction; and (3) the assumption of jurisdiction by
the forum state must not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice, consideration being given to the quality, nature,
and extent of the activity in the forum state, the relative convenience
of the parties, the benefits and protection of the laws of the forum
state afforded the respective parties, and the basic equities of the
situation." 163
The second prong of the O'Brien test, the nexus requirement, has been the
subject of controversy since adoption of the test. 164
Much of the controversy stemmed from the Texas Supreme Court's at-
tempt to clarify the meaning of article 2031b in U-AnchorAdvertising, Inc.
v. Burt,165 which, unfortunately, only muddied the water. 166 This confu-
sion resulted primarily from the fact that in U-Anchor the supreme court,
although expressly approving the O'Brien test, also broadly stated in a dic-
tum: "Article 2031b reaches as far as the federal constitutional require-
ments of due process will permit. We let stand the statement in Hopenfield
Arm Statute]; Note, Due Process Under the Texas Long-Arm Statute: U-Anchor Advertis-
ing, Inc. v. Burt-One More Tuft in the Morass ofIn Personam Jurisdiction Over the Non-
Resident Defendant, 15 Hous. L. REV. 1054 (1978).
159. U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977); O'Brien v. Lanpar
Co., 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966); see infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
160. See Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1266 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981). The prevail-
ing view, however, was not unanimous. See Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 37 Sw. L.J. 289, 290 (1983).
161. Jim Fox Enter., Inc. v. Air France, 705 F.2d 738, 740 (5th Cir. 1983).
162. 399 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966). The supreme court has restated this test on a number
of occasions. See, e.g., Hall 1, 25 Tex. S. Ct. J. at 192; Hall H, 638 S.W.2d at 872; Siskind v.
Villa Found. for Educ., Inc., 642 S.W.2d 434, 436 (Tex. 1982); U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v.
Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760, 762 (Tex. 1977).
163. 399 S.W.2d at 342 (quoting Tyee Constr. Co. v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 381 P.2d
245, 251 (Wash. 1963)).
164. Hall HI, 638 S.W.2d at 872; see also Hall 1, 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 192 (stating that
nexus test is not a rigid due process requirement).
165. 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977).
166. Thomas, supra note 60, at 387; see also Comment, Article 2031b, supra note 158, at
506. The Comment notes that the U-Anchor court "went out of its way to make jt known
that 2031 b would be interpreted as reaching constitutional limits," id., but unfortunately the
fact that this statement was made in a dictum, coupled with the court's citation to O'Brien as
the due process test, meant "the courts would be forced to again answer the question of
whether article 2031 b require[s] a nexus." Id.
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v. Crook . . . 'that the reach of Art. 203 1 b is limited only by the United
States Constitution.' ,167 Predictably, courts seeking to expand the reach
of long-arm jurisdiction in Texas have cited the broad language of U-
Anchor as authority for the position that the cause of action need not be
related to the defendant's contacts with the state. 168 Such analysis was
utilized despite the express language of article 2031 b.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, specifically rejected this
interpretation in its well-articulated and exhaustively researched opinion
in Prejean v. Sonairach, Inc. 169 In Preean the plaintiff argued, relying on
U-Anchor, that despite its literal language, article 2031b extended to
causes of action unrelated to a defendant's contacts with the forum. Ac-
knowledging that the broad language in the U-Anchor decision could be
construed as implying that article 2031 b reached the constitutional limits
of due process, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless refused to accept the plain-
tiffs view. The Fifth Circuit instead concluded that the U-Anchor lan-
guage directly addressed only the meaning of " 'doing business' in the
context of whether it is coextensive with the constitutional confines of due
process." 17 0
In addition to U-Anchor, the plaintiff in Prejean also relied on Navarro
v. Sedco, Inc. '7' The Fifth Circuit noted that the federal district court in
Navarro had seized on U-Anchor's broad language to support the proposi-
tion that the cause of action need not arise out of the defendant's business
in Texas.' 72 The Preean court concluded, in light of the fact that the ref-
erenced language in U-Anchor addressed only the issue of doing business,
that the Navarro court took the U-Anchor language out of context. 173 Ac-
cording to the Preean court, U-Anchor had not extended the reach of the
Texas long-arm statute. The Fifth Circuit determined the rule in Texas to
be that:
Article 203 lb demands what due process merely takes into account: a
nexus between the contacts with the forum and the cause of action of
167. 553 S.W.2d at 762. The Fifth Circuit indicated that the lack of clarity in interpreta-
tion of 2031b stems primarily from the O'Brien court's borrowing the three-pronged test
from the Tyee Construction opinion. The Washington Supreme Court intended Tyee Con-
struction to be a synthesis of the constitutional test and the requirements of the Washington
long-arm statute. The Washington statute, like article 2031b, required that the cause of
action arise out of the contacts with the forum. The Texas Supreme Court seemed to adopt
the "arising out of" requirement as the test for due process. This adoption, according to the
Fifth Circuit, has caused a great deal of the confusion as to whether the source of the nexus
requirement in Texas is statutory or constitutional. Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d
1260, 1266 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981).
168. See Navarro v. Sedco, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1978). Notwithstanding
O'Brien, numerous courts have opted for a broad interpretation of the "arising out of" lan-
guage of article 203 lb since its adoption in 1959. See Figari, supra note 160, at 290 n. 10. As
pointed out by the Fifth Circuit, however, the "lower court decisions after U-Anchor . . .
continued to require a nexus between the cause of action and the contacts with Texas."
Prejean v. Sonatrach, 652 F.2d 1260, 1267 n.8 (5th Cir. 1981).
169. 652 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1981).
170. Id at 1265-66.
171. 449 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D. Tex. 1978).




such a kind as to make the cause of action arise from those con-
tacts. . . .Until such time as the Texas Legislature should see fit to
eliminate the nexus requirement, service of process under Article
2031 b cannot be made validly on a nonresident defendant whose con-
tacts with Texas have no connection with the plaintiffs cause of
action. 174
B. Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A.
Shortly after the Fifth Circuit's decision in Prejean, the Texas Supreme
Court once again addressed the nexus requirement of article 203 lb in Hall
v. Helicopleros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. (Hall I).17 5 In Hall I the
court appeared to relax the rigid nexus requirement, 176 recognizing:
[A] nexus between the cause of action and the defendant's contacts
with the forum state is not a rigid due process requirement. It is,
however, a significant factor to be considered when evaluating the
fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction in a given case. A cause of
action asserted against a nonresident defendant that does not arise out
of something done in the foreign state compels proof of more perva-
sive contacts with the forum than a cause of action that is connected
with the defendant's activities in the state. . . . As the relationship
between the cause of action and the defendant's purposeful activity in
the state grows more tenuous, the plaintiff faces an ever increasing
burden of showing contacts with the forum sufficient to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction. 177
Despite its more flexible interpretation of the nexus requirement, however,
the supreme court held that the cause of action could not be maintained. 178
This holding resulted from the court's finding neither a relationship be-
tween the forum and the cause of action nor substantial contacts between
the defendant and the forum. 179
The Fifth Circuit considered Hall I a diversion from the Prejean rule by
a divided Texas court. 180 The Texas Supreme Court soon withdrew Hall I
and substituted Hall 11. Hall II "authoritatively ruled that business con-
tacts unrelated to the asserted cause of action are relevant to and will sup-
174. Id. (footnotes omitted).
175. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 190 (Feb. 24, 1982), rev'don rehearing, 638 S.W.2d 870 (Tex.
1982). This decision involved a suit by the surviving relatives of four United States citizens
killed in a helicopter crash in Peru. The deceased workers had been in Peru working on the
construction of a pipeline. The defendant provided the helicopter to transport the men and
supplies to and from the job site in the jungles of Peru.
176. Hall I suggested as an alternative to the rigid nexus requirement the balancing of
the "tenuous nexus" against the sufficiency of the defendant's contact. Id at 194; see also
Comment, Status of the Nexus Requirement, supra note 158, at 313-14 (nexus possibly re-
placed by substantial continuous and systematic contacts).
177. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 192.
178. Id at 194.
179. Id The court based this conclusion on the following facts: Neither any of the plain-
tiffs nor any of the deceased workers were Texas residents; the events, including the investi-
gation, occurred in South America; the witnesses and evidence were located in South
America; and the defendants' contacts with the state, primarily through negotiating con-
tracts, were unrelated to the cause of action.
180. Placid Investment, Ltd. v. Girard Trust Bank, 689 F.2d 1218, 1219 (5th Cir. 1982).
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port the exercise of personal jurisdiction under article 2031b."181 The
language of Hall II provides ample support for this position:
[T]he second prong [of the three-pronged test of O'Brien] is unneces-
sary when the nonresident defendants [sic] presence in the forum
through numerous contacts is of such a nature, as in this case, so as to
satisfy the demands of the ultimate test of due process. Accordingly
through the statutory authority of Art. 2031b Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. there remains a single inquiry: is the exercise of jurisdiction
consistent with the requirements of due process of law under the
United States Constitution?18 2
The court in Hall I had not found the contacts to be substantial enough
to sustain jurisdiction when the nexus between the cause of action and the
forum was so tenuous as to be nonexistent. 83 Once Hall II redefined the
nexus requirement, however, the defendant's presence in the forum
through numerous unrelated contacts was clearly sufficient to satisfy the
ultimate demands of due process.' 84 Hall II is clearly authority for a
Texas court's exercise of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant whose
business contacts with the state are substantial. Such an exercise of juris-
diction is valid even if the defendant's business contacts are unrelated to
the specific cause of action. Other decisions during the survey period,
however, demonstrate that a significant controversy remains as to whether
the nexus requirement of article 203 1b has been completely abandoned.
C Decisions During the Survey Period
The earliest Fifth Circuit opinions following Hall II appear to have
taken the position that the nexus requirement of article 203 1 b had been
eliminated entirely. The first of the Fifth Circuit decisions to reexamine
the reach of the Texas long-arm statute after Hall 11 was Placid In vestment,
Ltd v. Girard Trust Bank. 85 In Placid Inyestment the Fifth Circuit con-
cluded that its earlier view, expressed both in Prejean and in an earlier
Placid Investment opinion was no longer in harmony with Texas author-
ity. 186 The court viewed Hall II as having swept aside established prece-
dent and extended the reach of article 2031 b to the limits of due process. 187
Accordingly, the court remanded the case, noting that the district court
had found that the defendant was doing business in Texas, but had made
its finding without reference to the new Texas rule. 88
Fifth Circuit decisions immediately following Placid Investment, includ-
ing two others on petition for rehearing in light of Hall 11, 189 were uniform
181. Figari, supra note 160, at 291.
182. 638 S.W.2d at 872 (emphasis added).
183. 25 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 194.
184. 638 S.W.2d at 871-72.
185. 689 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1982).
186. Id. at 1219.
187. Id
188. Id. at 1220.
189. Wyatt v. Kaplan, 712 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1983); Jim Fox Enters., Inc. v. Air France,
705 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983). In Wyatt the court originally held that the plaintiff was not
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in holding that the Texas long-arm statute no longer required that the
cause of action arise out of the defendant's contacts with Texas.' 90 In
finding that Hall H negated the need for the first step of the process, how-
ever, these Fifth Circuit decisions failed to give effect to the Texas
Supreme Court's confirmation in Hall H of the vitality of the three-
pronged O'Brien test. The Hall II court expressly stated: "The second
prong is useful in any fact situation in which a jurisdiction question exists;
and is a necessary requirement where the nonresident defendant only
maintained single or few contacts with the forum."' 191 The Fifth Circuit
opinions focused instead on the Hall II statement making reference only
to the situation where the defendant's presence in the forum through nu-
merous contacts was of such a nature as to satisfy the demands of due
process. 192
entitled to discovery concerning personal jurisdiction, because the business contacts of the
defendant within the state were unrelated to the cause of action. Noting the Texas Supreme
Court's position against requiring that the cause of action arise out of contacts with Texas,
the court nevertheless upheld the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 712 F.2d
at 1002. In Jim Fox Enterprises the court denied the petition for rehearing, withdrew its
former opinion, and remanded the case a second time for further proceedings consistent
with its finding that the sole inquiry after Hall II was whether the exercise of jurisdiction
would be consistent with the requirements of constitutional due process. 705 F.2d at 741.
The court in Jim Fox Enterprises addressed in a footnote a related problem that often
arises in personal jurisdiction cases: whether TEX. R. Civ. P. 108, extending service of pro-
cess over an individual "to the full extent that he may be required to appear and answer
under the constitution of the United States in an action either in rem or in personam,"
actually extends a Texas court's jurisdiction beyond that set forth by the Texas Legislature
in art. 2031b. Plaintiffs in jurisdiction cases, including the plaintiff in Jim Fox Enterprises,
have argued that even though the nonresident defendant may not be amenable to jurisdic-
tion under article 203 1b because of the nexus requirement contained therein, he may still be
served pursuant to rule 108. Notwithstanding that the Texas Supreme Court had explicitly
stated that the purpose of the amendment was to extend personal jurisdiction to the constitu-
tional limits, U-Anchor, 553 S.W.2d at 762 n.1, the Fifth Circuit noted that its established
rule has been not to allow a rule of procedure to be used as an end run around the jurisdic-
tional requirements in art. 203 lb, and that "we do not depart from our position here and do
not suggest that Rule 108 be relied on here." 705 F.2d at 741 n.5.
If the early position of the Fifth Circuit that the Texas long-arm statute no longer has a
nexus requirement after Hall II was correct, then its view of service of process under rule
108 should have been reconsidered at that time. Otherwise, the Fifth Circuit would seem to
have been endorsing the Texas Supreme Court's accomplishing by case law what the Fifth
Circuit would not have condoned being done by rule. For a further discussion of this prob-
lem, see Comment, Article 2031b, supra note 158, at 503.
190. Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 693 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1982) (noting Hall HI eliminated
nexus requirement; thus finding jurisdiction over defendant because of fairly substantial
general contacts with Texas); Loumar v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983) (recognizing
Texas long-arm statute stretches to limits of constitutional due process, but finding no juris-
diction over defendants whose only contact was advertising in nationally circulated publica-
tions possibly circulated in Texas).
Two district courts followed the Fifth Circuit's Placid Investment interpretation of Hall I.
See Bennett Indus., Inc. v. Laher, 557 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Tex. 1983); Samuels v. BMW of
N. Am., Inc., 554 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Tex. 1983).
191. 638 S.W.2d at 872 (emphasis added).
192. Prejean, 652 F.2d at 1267 (discussing HallIl, 638 S.W.2d at 872). Furthermore, this
statement by the court does not necessarily have to be read as inconsistent with the language
of art. 2031b or the nexus requirement. Another reading is that, in an effort to simplify the
three-pronged test, the court is willing to presume a nexus when the nonresident defendant
has numerous contacts with the forum. Upon the presence of numerous contacts, a close
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Those early Fifth Circuit decisions following Hall II could be inter-
preted as holding only that the nexus requirement of article 2031 b need no
longer be satisfied when the nonresident defendant has numerous contacts
with the state. 193 The specific language of those opinions, however, ap-
peared to be more sweeping. They seemed to ignore that Hall II was lim-
ited to the situation involving a nonresident defendant with numerous
contacts with the state. Moreover, the plain language of article 2031 b itself
does not seem to have been considered. 94
examination of the contacts should invariably reveal some relationship between those con-
tacts and the cause of action.
193. The leading decision in the Fifth Circuit after Hall HI, Placid Inv., Ltd. v. Girard
Trust Bank, 689 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1982), supports this position. Placid involved a nonresi-
dent defendant that maintained bank accounts in Texas, owned real estate in Texas, solic-
ited business in Texas, and received revenue from Texas sources. Placid Inv., Ltd. v. Girard
Trust Bank, 662 F.2d 1176, 1178 (5th Cir. 1981) (first Placid decision). Thus, no question
existed whether the nonresident defendant had substantial contacts with the forum state.
The Fifth Circuit's sweeping statements striking the nexus requirement after Hall II were
possibly applicable solely in the context of a defendant with a definite presence in the forum.
If so, the court failed to clarify this point. Other Fifth Circuit decisions may have been
similarly motivated. See also Lapeyrouse v. Texaco, Inc., 693 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1981)
(defendant's contacts with Texas derived from performing over 7000 hours of labor during
fifteen separate periods of employment in state); Jim Fox Enters., Inc. v. Air France, 664
F.2d 63 (5th Cir. 1982), opinion withdrawn in part on reh'g, 705 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983)
(defendant maintained Houston airline ticket office, leased Texas property, employed Texas
citizens, and listed numerous Houston office phone numbers).
Two other Fifth Circuit decisions involved nonresident defendants with no substantial
contacts with the forum state. These decisions are equally unclear as to the exact scope of
Hall II. Application of the nexus requirement to defendants whose contacts are minimal or
nonexistent was not considered in either case. See Wyatt v. Kaplan, 712 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir.
1983) (plaintiff failed to make prima facie showing of tort and therefore did not meet "doing
business" requirements of art. 203 1b, § 4); Loumar v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983)
(requirements of due process not met; thus issue of whether defendant's minimum contacts
must relate to cause of action not addressed).
194. A strong argument against the contention that Hall 1 eliminated the nexus require-
ment entirely is that it seems questionable that the Texas Supreme Court would ignore com-
pletely the express statutory language of art. 203 lb. Justice Pope addressed this issue in his
dissenting opinion in Hall II:
Article 2031b limits Texas' interest, to suits arising out of acts done in this
state. A desire to gain jurisdiction over nonresidents for unrelated actions
arising from activities outside the state is not reflected in the history of the
statute or in the act's clear and unambiguous wording. Certainly, the legisla-
ture could have drafted the statute in language expressly extending its effect to
the full extent permitted by the Constitution, . . . or it could have left out the
nexus requirement . . . . Absent such legislative action, however, we must
enforce the clear provisions of article 203 lb as presently written.
638 S.W.2d at 879-80 (Pope, J., dissenting).
Justice Pope's dissent aptly refuted the contention that the statute was originally enacted
to extend to the full limits of constitutional due process. He pointed out that, at the time of
the statute's enactment, authority existed for the proposition that states could exercise juris-
diction over unrelated causes of action in certain situations. Although other states's legisla-
tures had incorporated that concept in their long-arm provisions, the Texas Legislature did
not do so. Justice Pope also observed that the court could not simply assume that the draft-
ers would have extended the statute to constitutional limits, as it is entirely possible that the
legislature in drafting art. 2031b was willing to extend the limits of jurisdictional authority
only to the extent that a nexus was present, thus ensuring its courts would hear only matters
in which the state truly had an interest. Id at 880.
Justice Pope was concerned that Texas might become "the courthouse for the world." Id.
at 877. This fear could be justified if, after Hall II, Texas courts interpret art. 203 1b as
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A more recent Fifth Circuit opinion, however, C & H Transportation Co.
v. Jensen & Reynolds Construction Co. ,195 has acknowledged the more lim-
ited language of Hall II and thereby has signaled an apparent movement
away from the unqualified position expressed in the Placid Investments
line of decisions. In C & H Transportation the Court recognized in a
dictum: 196
Although in Hall v. Helicopteros Nacionales . . . the Texas
Supreme Court extended the reach of article 203 lb to the limits of due
process, language in the opinion indicates that the second prong, the
nexus requirement, is constitutionally required in cases where the
nonresident defendant only maintained single or few contacts with the
forum. .... 197
A recent Texas Supreme Court decision, Siskind v. Villa Foundation for
Education, Inc. ,198 provides further support for the Fifth Circuit's ac-
knowledgment in C & H Transportation that Hall II was not intended to
eliminate entirely the nexus requirement of article 203 lb. In Siskind,
handed down less than a month after Hall II, the court reiterated its state-
ment from Hall II, that it would apply the three-pronged O'Brien test in
jurisdictional cases involving nonresidents with only a single or few Texas
contacts. 199 The court then methodically applied that test to the acts of the
defendant, an operator of an Arizona boarding school. 2°° The defendant
had solicited business in Texas through advertisements in national publi-
cations circulated in Texas, advertised in the telephone directories of vari-
ous Texas cities, and mailed informational packets and applications to
inquiring Texas families. The supreme court, after applying each prong of
the test, determined that a Texas court could maintain jurisdiction over the
operator of the Arizona boarding school.2°1
broadly as the Fifth Circuit has interpreted the constitutional limits of due process. See
Oswald v. Scripto, 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980) (permitting jurisdiction over Japanese manu-
facturer whose only contact with forum was national marketing of product by American
distributor who purchased products in Japan).
195. 719 F.2d 1267 (5th Cir. 1983).
196. It was unnecessary for the court actually to address the nexus issue, as it apparently
was uncontrovertible that this requirement was fully satisfied by the defendant's contacts.
Id. at 1269 n.7.
197. Id. at 1269 n.8.
198. 642 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1982).
199. Id. at 436 (quoting U-Anchor Advertising, Inc. v. Burt, 553 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1978)). It can be inferred from the court's citation to U-Anchor,
without any reference to Hall II, that the latter decision is not as sweeping as the Fifth
Circuit in Placid Investment thought it to be. Hall 1H is possibly merely a clarification of U-
Anchor.
200. 642 S.W.2d at 436.
201. Id at 436-48. Specifically, the court found the plaintiffs cause of action for breach
of contract and misrepresentations was connected with the defendant's advertisements, let-
ters, and other activities in Texas. Id. at 437. The court dismissed the action, however, as to
the employees of the boarding school because the plaintiff had not alleged that the employ-
ees had committed any acts in Texas. The court determined it could not exert jurisdiction
over the defendants simply because their employer had solicited business in the state. As the
supreme court noted, "[c]onstitutional considerations of due process forbid this bootstrap-
ping of minimum contacts." Id. at 438. For a discussion of Siskind and the fiduciary shield
principle, see Figari, supra note 160, at 292.
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In writing the Siskind opinion the supreme court certainly would not
have reiterated the Hall HI language, cited the O'Brien test with approval,
and painstakingly demonstrated that each of the three requirements under
the O'Brien test had been met if the court actually had intended to elimi-
nate altogether the nexus requirement of article 2031b. The Austin court
of appeals shares this view. That court has held that its understanding of
Hall II and Siskind, is that "under art. 203 lb, a tripartite test must be met
in order to subject a non-resident to jurisdiction in Texas when his contacts
in Texas are few or only one."' 20 2 The court recognized that after Hall II
application of the second prong of the tripartite O'Brien test is unnecessary
when a nonresident has numerous contacts with the forum state. The
court concluded that jurisdiction was not proper because the only contact
the defendant had with Texas was entering into a licensing agreement, an
act totally unrelated to the cause of action.203
As discussed above, some courts have sought to view Hall II as having
ended the confusion surrounding the reach of article 2031 b by eliminating
entirely the nexus requirement. These authors, however, believe that com-
plete elimination of the nexus requirement was neither the holding nor the
intent of Hall HI. Although the Fifth Circuit now appears to be coming
around to this viewpoint,2°4 this area will nevertheless continue to be one
of controversy until either the legislature amends article 203 1 b20 5 or the
supreme court has stated its position so often that it can no longer be mis-
understood or ignored. Until then, the struggle as to "the exact scope of
[Hall/ ]-1206 will continue.
202. King v. Dupuis, 649 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ).
203. Id. But see Verges v. Lomas & Nettleton Fin. Corp., 642 S.W.2d 820, 822 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1982, no writ) (Dallas court of appeals stated in a dictum that art. 203 lb has
been held to reach as far as due process will permit, citing Hall I1 and U-Anchor). The
Amarillo court of appeals also addressed the question of the reach of art. 2031 b after Hall
11. That court appears to have confused the statutory requirement of art. 203 1b and the
constitutional requirements of due process. The Amarillo court first defined the constitu-
tional limits of due process as developed through the Supreme Court cases beginning with
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), but further stated: "Consistent
with the foregoing principles, Texas has constructed a three element test, stated in O'Brien v.
Lanpar Company, 399 S.W.2d 340, 342 (Tex. 1966), and recently reiterated in Hall v.
Helicopteros Nationales De Colombia, 638 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1982), to determine
whether dueprocess is satisfied " Plain Bag & Bagging Co. v. Golby Bag Co., 643 S.W.2d
509, 511 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ) (emphasis added). That court obviously un-
derstood that the law requires the cause of action to be related to the defendant's contacts.
The court, however, seems confused as to whether the source of this requirement is constitu-
tional or statutory.
204. See supra 195-97 and accompanying text.
205. For discussions proposing such a revision, see Comment, Article 2031b, supra note
158, at 511-14; Comment, The Texas Long-Arm Statute, supra note 158, at 760.
206. Bennet Indus., Inc. v. Laher, 557 F. Supp. 965, 966 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
[Vol. 38
